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SUBSTITUTING FORCE FOR DIPLOMACY:
TODAY GRENADA, TOMORROW ... ?
On October 25, 1983 nearly 2,000 U.S. Marines and Army Rangers stormed the tiny Caribbean island of Grenada. A
bloody coup, which left Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and at least sixteen other persons dead, finally had provided the
Reagan administration with the long-awaited excuse to resort to military intervention. In justifying the invasion, President
Reagan first offered three reasons for his "decisive action:" to protect the lives of up to 1,000 Americans residing on the
island, to "forestall further chaos," and to assist in the restoration of conditions of law and order on the island. To
shroud his blatantly illegal act in some form of legitimacy, the Reagan administration later added that the invasion had
been carried out in response to a request made by Grenada's frightened neighbors in the Eastern Caribbean-Antigua,
Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent-and by two other CARI COM members-Barbados and Jamaica. Further, the President argued that the island had become "a Soviet-Cuban colony" being readied to strike at its neighbors. Grenada, therefore,
posed an intolerable threat to U.S. national interests.
President Reagan had always believed that the U.S. had a special responsibility to maintain order in its backyard. In
invading Grenada, the administration hoped to attain goals that heretofore had been unattainable. It could remove the
last vestige of a government it hated; it eventually could install the
government of its choosing; and it could frighten progressive governments or left-leaning movements throughout the region.
In the final analysis, the invasion also had been launched to send
a clear signal to the Soviets, the Cubans, the Nicaraguans, the
Syrians, and all other troublemakers. Although it was coincidental
that the invasion of Grenada occurred just two days after more than
two hundred U.S. Marines were killed in Lebanon, both are horrify§ ing examples of growing U.S. militarism. The message the admino. istration intended the Grenadian invasion to convey was that the U.S.
[ would assert its authority and impose its will from Nicaragua to
1 Namibia through armed intervention if necessary. Consequently,
; '' American military personnel are now . .. everywhere: in El Salvador,
~ in the Sudan, in Lebanon, in England and West Germany, in Turkey
and Greece, in Diego Garcia and South Korea and Honduras ... and around the Persian Gulf,"as British historian E. P.
Thompson has written.
After the first few hours, the Reagan administration boasted that its invasion had been a ''complete success.'' Certainly,
thousands of Marines could make short shrift of the 110,000 Grenadian people and fewer than 800 Cuban collaboration
workers on the island . Equally important, the invasion scored a significant domestic political victory for Reagan. Having
barred the press from covering the invasion, the administration was free to feed a sanitized version of the invasion to the
American people; and this version went largely unchallenged even after the press was allowed on the island.
The polls taken after the invasion clearly demonstrated public approval. Although constitutionally-protected rights such
as freedom of the press are supposedly sacred in this country, relatively little opposition to the ban on the press was recorded. Concerns about international law, diplomacy, relations with U.S. allies, and worldwide condemnation all were completely forgotten.
The attack on Grenada seemed to instill a renewed feeling of confidence in the national psyche. In one move it seemed
that Washington had magically blotted out the memories of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the Vietnam War, Watergate, and the
Iranian hostage crisis. Returning veterans received a hero's welcome and were asked few questions by the majority of Americans
who had not experienced the horrors of war firsthand. The resurgence of militarism became evident as combat uniforms
and paraphernalia became popular fashion items, and the armed forces reported an increasing number of new recruits.
This ISSUE BRIEF looks at the invasion of Grenada within the larger context of U.S. military intervention throughout
this hemisphere on numerous occasions sigce the nineteenth century. Current actions fall neatly within the long pattern
of U.S . relations with its neighbors because the U .S. again relied on brute force rather than diplomacy to compel compliance with its wishes. Indeed, previous U.S. governments voiced exactly the same pretext in almost exactly the same words
to explain the invasions of Cuba in 1898, Nicaragua in 1912, and the Dominican Republic in 1965. The invasion of Grenada
has shown that the U.S. still shoots first and asks questions later. For the rest of the world-both friend and foe alikeundoubtedly, this is a frightening precedent. □

U.S. INTERVENTION: THE MORE THINGS CHANGE . . . .
"I spent 33 years and 4 months in active service as a member
of our country's most agile military force-the Marine Corps .
. . . I spent most of my time being a highclass muscle man
for big business. for Wall Street, and for bankers. . . . Thus,
I helped make Mexico . .. safe for American oil interests in
1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the
National City Bank boys to collect revenues in . ... I helped
purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of
Brown Brothers in 1909-1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. 1 helped
make Honduras 'right' for American fruit companies in
1903 .... "
U.S. Major General Smedley D. Butler
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For more than 150 years, the United States has intervened
repeatedly in the political and economic affairs of its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere. Since warning European
nations to refrain from interference in "Our Hemisphere"
with the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the
U.S. has attempted to assert its hegemony and to "protect"
its interests throughout the region . As a consequence, the
U.S. has found it necessary to participate in more than eighty
instances of military hostility in this region alone. Of course,
having been self-appointed as the arbiter of the affairs of
the region, the t.: .S. has felt no need to gain the prior consent of those countries it deemed necessary to protect.
Rather, it has intervened willfully in blatant violation of
international law with impunity.
Through its earliest interventions, the U.S. began the process of building the American empire and of consolidating
its position as the dominant economic power in the region.
U.S. entrepreneurs found that neighboring less-developed
nations offered cheap raw material, a cheaper labor force,
and ample opportunities for investment. Thus, as the Secretary of State during the presidency of William Howard Taft
described it, U.S. policymakers came to envision the region
as "a game preserve from which poachers were excluded
but where the proprietor may hunt as he pleases." In this
context, the U.S. government began intervening in the internal affairs of other nations to protect the interests of American private investors. If a country defaulted on its repayment of loans made by private banks, the U.S. government
would occupy the country, assume control of that country's
government, and force repayment. Consequently, intervention in the early decades of the twentieth century resulted
in protracted U.S . military occupation of five nations.
Since the Cold War of the 1950s, U.S. intervention has
been directed toward preventing progressive change, popular
insurgency, and social revolution in the region. Again, the
tnreat progressive change has posed is largely to the U.S.
business community. If revolutionary governments assume
power and are committed to strengthening their national
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economies or to lessenmg traditional ties of dependence,
then they are perceived to represent a threat to American
firms with substantial interests in those countries.
Hence, in the last two centuries the U.S. has "sent in the
Marines" from Panama to Paraguay. The methods of intervention employed have been quite varied: political "protection," economic pressure, financial control, military occupation, and more discreet "shows of force," among others.
The pretexts for these interventions, on the other hand, have
been all too similar. As in the most recent case, U.S. governments have cloaked their baser motives by invoking "nobler" objectives-"protecting American lives and property"
or "safeguarding freedom and democracy."
Clearly, American property has been a real consideration,
but "safeguarding freedom aad democracy" has been much
less so. The historical record demonstrates that the U.S. has
shown no ability to restore democracy through its many interventions. In fact the more likely result of intervention has
been support for corrupt and repressive dictators who could
not remain in power without U.S. protection. The U.S. has
fought to maintain governments which suit the image of
U.S. policymakers and which allow American businesses to
conduct business as usual. For example, interventions in
both Guatemala and Chile removed democratically-elected
governments; and the invasion of the Dominican Republic
prevented the return to office of a democratically-elected
government which had been overthrown. As Franklin
Roosevelt aptly put it, the U.S. has preferred to support
"our son of a bitch" rather than risk revolutionary change
no matter what the cost to the people of that country.
Until the invasion and occupation of Grenada, the one
exception to the rule of U.S. intervention in this hemisphere
had been the English-speaking Caribbean. As former colonies of Great Britain and as members of the British Commonwealth, these nations had not suffered the fate of the
former colonies of France and Spain. What the Reagan administration's military intervention has done is to signal a
renewed determination by the U.S. to exert control over the
entire hemisphere.
Long after U.S. combat troops return from Grenada, the
entire region will be affected by the intervention of yet
another nation by the United States. The invasion of Grenada demonstrated once more U.S. disregard for the sovereignty of its neighbors, its intolerance of diversity, and its contempt for diplomatic solutions to problems. The logical
question raised by the invasion is when will the U.S. strike
again. Who will be the next vicdm'? Today Grenada, tomorrow Nicaragua. . . . □
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A HISTORY OF U.S. INTERVENTION: WHO INVITED U.S.?
1833:
1835
1846:
1852:
1853:
1854:
1855:
1856:
1858:

1865:
1868:
1888:

1890:
1891:
1894:

1895:
1896:
1898:

1899:

1903:

1904:
1906:

1907:

U.S . sends forces to Argentina to protect American interests during an insurrection .
Marines protect American interests in Peru during an attempted revolution.
U.S. fights war with Mexico which ends in 1848.
Marines land in Argentina to protect American interests
during a revolution.
U.S. intervenes in Nicaragua to protect American lives and
interests during political disturbances.
U .S. destroys Nicaraguan city to avenge an insult to the
American Minister to Nicaragua.
U.S . and European naval forces land to protect American
interests during an attempted revolution in Uruguay.
U .S. intervenes to protect American interests during an
insurrection in Panama .
Forces from two U.S. warships land to protect American
propert y during a revolution in Uruguay.
Congress authorizes a naval squadron to seek redress for
an attack on a naval vessel in Paraguay.
U.S. intervenes in Panama to protect the lives and property
of American residents during a revolution.
U.S. sends forces to Uruguay to protect foreign residents
and the customhouse during an insurrection.
U.S. sends troops to Haiti to persuade the Haitian government to give up an American steamer which had been
seized on the charge of breach of blockade.
U.S. naval party lands in Argentina to protect U .S. consulate and legation in Buenos Aires.
U.S . intervenes to protect American citizens during a revolution in Chile.
U.S. sends forces to Brazil to protect American commerce
during a Brazilian civil war. No landing is attempted, but
there is a display of naval force.
U.S. intervenes to protect American interests in Bluefields,
Nicaragua following a revolution.
U.S. sends troops to protect American interests in Colombia.
U.S. sends forces to Nicaragua to protect American lives
and property.
U.S. intervenes in Nicaragua to protect American lives and
property.
U.S . intervenes in Cuban war for independence from
Spain, defeats Spain, and assumes control of Puerto Rico,
Cuba, Hawaii, and the Philippines .
U.S. sends forces to Nicaragua to protect American interests during an insurrection.
U.S. establishes military rule in Cuba which lasts until
1902.
U.S. sends forces to Honduras to protect the American
consulate.
U.S . intervenes in the Dominican Republic to protect
American interests during a revolutionary outbreak.
U.S. sends troops to Panama to protect American interest following the revolution for independence from Colombia over construction of the Isthmian canal. With brief
intermissions, U.S. stations troops in Panama to guard
U.S . interests until 1914.
U.S. sends troops to the Dominican Republic to protect
American interests during revolutionary fighting.
U.S. intervenes to restore order, protect foreigners, and
establish a stable government in Cuba. U .S.-imposed civilmilitary rule lasts until 1909.
U.S . sends troops to Honduras to protect American interests during a war between Honduras and Nicaragua.

1910:
1911:
1912:

1914:

1915:
1916:
1917:

1919:
1920:

1921:
1924:
1925:

1926:

1933:

1940:

1954:
1961:
1962:
1964:
1965:
1973:

1983:
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U.S . intervenes during a civil war in Nicaragua to protect
American interests.
U.S . sends forces to Honduras to protect American lives
and property during a civil war.
U.S . lands a small force in Honduras to prevent government seizure of an American-owned railroad.
U.S. troops supervise elections in Panama.
U.S. intervenes to protect American interew, in Cuba .
U.S. sends troops to Nicaragua 10 protect American interests during an attempted revolution. A ,mall fon.:e would
remain until 1925.
U.S. sends forces to Haiti 10 protect Ameri can national,
during a period of unrest.
U.S . naval force by gunfire stops the bombardment of
Puerto Plaza and by threat of force maintains Santo Domingo City in the Dominican Republic during a rc"olutionary movement.
U.S. maintains order in Haiti from a period of threa ten ed
insurrection until I 934.
U.S. forces intervene and maintain order in the Dominican Republic until 1924.
U.S. sends forces to Cuba to protect American interests
during an insurrection and subsequent unsettled conditions. Most of the force leaves Cuba by 1919, but two companies remain until 1922. U.S . maintain \ prc\encc until
1933.
U.S. sends forces ashore to maintain order in Hondura\
during an attempted revolution.
U.S. intervenes in Guatemala to protect American intere,ts
during a period of fighting between the Unionist Party
and the government.
U.S. intervenes to prevent a war between Panama and
Costa Rica over a boundary di spute.
U.S. sends troops to Hondura, to protect American lives
and interests during election ho~tilities.
U.S. sends forces to Honduras to protect foreigners during
a political upheaval.
U.S. lands troops in Panama to keep order and protect
American interests .
U.S . sends Marines to Nicaragua to protect American
interests during an attempted revolution. Some U.S. forces
remain in the country until I 933 .
U.S . Naval forces demonstrate off Cuban shores during
a revolution against President Gerardo Machado, but no
landing is made.
U.S. sends troops to guard air and naval bases in Bermuda,
St. Lucia, Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, Trinidad, and
British Guiana obtained by negotiation with Great Britain
against the wishes of the local governments.
U .S.-sponsored coup results in the overthrow of the democratically-elected government of Guatemala.
U.S. sponsors invasion of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba.
U.S. imposes naval blockade of Cuba.
U.S. troops kill student protesters in the Panama Canal
Zone.
U.S. invades the Dominican Republic and forces the overthrow of the elected government of Juan Bosch.
U .S.-sponsored coup results in the overthrow of the democratically-elected government of Salvador Allende in
Chile .
U.S. invades Grenada to protect American students and
to restore democracy.
□

VIEWPOINT: MICHAEL MANLEY
cuted Bishop and frightened t11em all was of benefit for the
time being. Therefore, in the short-run the invasion would
be popular.
Trinidad is the island closest to Grenada. A poll there
found that sixty-one percent of the people favored the invasion and only thirty-nine percent were opposed . There is
a tremendous inter-penetration of population between Trinidad and Grenada. The emotions, therefore, spill over. In
Jamaica fifty-eight percent of those polled favored the invasion while forty-two percent were opposed . The polls are
obviously accurate. But this degree of opposition to the invasion is really quite an achievement when you consider the
massive manipulation that has occurred.
The tremendous propaganda build-up that accompanied
the invasion was unprecedented in the Caribbean. The
Cuban presence was exaggerated, distorted, and lied about.
The dishonesty can have no equal in the last twenty years
of international history. The Caribbean press has pushed
that propaganda line and absolutely nothing else. This must
be attributed to the power of the press and is a comment
on the dishonesty of the press. It has literally presented a
view of events that is just unbelievable.
In Jamaica the propaganda being spread through the
streets is ''if Manley comes back to power, that is what will
happen to him and that will lead to an invasion and all the
horrors will be brought to Jamaica." Though completely
childish, this kind of propaganda has its effects in the shortrun.
The invasion throws down the gauntlet to the political process to sort itself out. One can expect as rapidly as possible
the development of a new alignment of forces in the Caribbean, in Latin America, in the Third World, and in the
United States which will put the issues of sovereignty and
the right of countries to be free to pursue the process of their
self-determination on the line .
The invasion already is beginning to force the Caribbean
political leadership to sort itself out between the neo-colonialists like Seaga and Adams-whose only interest is the
promotion of the region as an out-post for tourism and U.S.
multinational corporations-and what I would call the patriots-the genuine independence people, whether socialist
or not, who begin with a strong sense of Caribbean nationalism. People must now stop and think: what has happened
to our independence that we could by our own act wipe it
out so quickly.
CARICOM had already been under tremendous strain.
It, in fact, will now be under greater strain because it appears that Barbados and Jamaica sat at the CARICOM Conference on the fateful weekend before the invasion having
already made their deals with President Reagan to invade
Grenada. They sat at the Conference with their major senior
colleagues and concealed that fact from them. Therefore,
they had a CARICOM meeting which represented a very
dark chapter in Caribbean history. One set of people had
made a secret deal and another set of people not only disapproved of that kind of solution to the problem but also did
not even know that the deal had been made. It is scandalous
for members of a region to regard themselves as having a
deeper allegiance and contact with a major superpower than
with their own regional colleagues; and we are going to pay
dearly for it. □

The invasion of Grenada has set a most dangerous precedent. It has brought the English-speaking Caribbean within
the tradition of U.S. intervention in this Hemisphere, which
has been a long and formidable one for the last one hundred years. The English-speaking Caribbean had always
been spared that because we have been a part of the British
Commonwealth. We have now by our own invitation defined ourselves within that sphere in which there is a clear
precedent for U.S. military intervention.
We do not know that the U.S. would have invaded if they
had not been invited. I have no doubt that they did it with
relish . I have no doubt that they always had a contingency
plan to do it. I have no doubt that they were merely waiting
for the appropriate pretext. The fact is, however, that they
were invited. This is an absolutely disasterous error in its
implications for the future.
One has to draw a very careful distinction between the
probable motivation of the members of the OECS and that
of Jamaica and Barbados. It may well be that the OECS
countries felt threatened and were genuinely frightened by
the whole situation. But it was also true that they thought
of this as a good opportunity to get rid of any traces of a
genuinely progressive political process of the sort that Bishop
symbolized. They wanted to remove that political process
and thereby to eliminate what they regarded as a danger to
the region.
In so far as Barbados and Jamaica are concerned, I have
absolutely no doubt that there was no question of fear of
anything at all. They acted as a result of their own internal
political agenda. They saw the tremendous mistake and disaster that occurred in Grenada as an opportunity to remove
all traces of the kind of progressive process that Bishop
represented.
The errors that were made within Grenada itself are a very
real set-back to the progressive cause. On the other hand,
the invasion is going to have a different effect. The invasion is now very popular in the Caribbean for a variety of
reasons. Of course, this popularity represents at least a temporary setback of serious proportions. It was overwhelmingly popular in Grenada for three reasons. Everybody in
the minority who was opposed to the progressive direction
of affairs is thrilled about the invasion because it wipes out
the progressive process for the time being. The great majority of the people who really loved Bishop very, very deeply
are thrilled because they feel his execution has been avenged
and that his executioners will now be punished. Therefore,
they see the invasion as a great act of revenge for Bishop.
Obviously, Bishop's being avenged is something that would
emotionally appeal to them in the short-run. There are also
a lot of other people who might not have fallen into either
one of those categories but who were absolutel y scared out
of their wits. Their feeling was that anything that could lift
the curfew and could deal with the military group who exe-

Michael Manley is form er Prime Minister of Jamaica and leader
of the opposition People's National Party.
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GRENADA'S "REAL" THREAT

facilities. Each parish was equipped with a medical and a
dental clinic. Twenty-eight medical stations were placed
throughout the country. New departments were added to
the main hospital; and the Ministry of Health offered the
assi ~tance of a professional health planner. The government
created a Food and Nutrition Council to combat dietary
problems and stressed the importance of preventive medicine
in attacking the nation's health problems.
In sharp contrast to Grenada's progress, the situation in
neighboring countries remained bleak. Life-threatening
hunger may not exist, but chronic malnutrition and the lack
of stable employment still are serious problems. Although
Antigua has an abundance of arable land, food production
in this country decreased due to government policies emphasizing tourism and foreign investment. In Dominica
eighty percent of children under five suffer from intestinal
parasites. The local diet is adequate in calories but deficient
in proteins. Forty-four percent of the land is divided among
forty-one large estates while ninety-eight percent of those
who work the land are either small farmers or sharecroppers whose plots are too small to support their families. In
St. Vincent nine farms comprise fifty-one percent of the
arable land. Unlike the NJM, the governments of these
countries have shown little concern for the needs of their
poor, especially in the rural areas.
Unable to discount the social and economic progress that
had been made in Grenada, its neighbors focused their most
vocal complaints on the PRG's abandonment of Westminster-style parliamentary democracy . After years of perverse
manipulation of the electoral system by Gairy, the Grenadian revolution was directed toward creating an "alternative
model of change." Although the PRG recognized that the
active participation of the Grenadian people was critical,
it did not give precedence to the establishment of a formal
electoral mechanism for channeling that participation. Instead, the Bishop government sought to fulfill this objective by diffusing political power and by encouraging broadbased participation. In 1981 the NJM opened membership
in the party support groups and mass organizations . As a
result, the Parish councils-the organs of popular participation-were inundated with new members . The NJM further decentralized the political process by instituting Zonal
Councils in each of Grenada's seven parishes. These bodies
provided regular interaction between the Grenadian people
and their government based on a principle of accountability in which officials would face the citizenry to account for
their performance. At the typical Zonal and Parish Council meetings, a member of the PRG Cabinet and one or more
managerial-level government officials would be present to
report, listen, and answer questions concerning current policies, the implementation of programs, and local grievances
or concerns.
During its last year, the PRG began the process of creating
a formal, electoral system which would institutionalize popular democracy. In June Prime Minister Bishop announced
the formation of a national Constitutional Commission
which would draft a constitution, propose an electoral
system suitable for Grenada, and hold elections in the near
future.
As a result of its inability to resolve internal differences
humanely, the NJM's ]audible accomplishments have been
destroyed. The current occupation of Grenada wipes out all
possibilities that the system envisioned by the PRG will be
created in Grenada. What we are left with is a noble experiment which suffered an untimely demise. □

" People of Grenada. this rerolt11ion is for \\'Ork, fo r f ood,
fo r decen t housing and health sen·ices, and fo r a bright f uture
for our children and great grandchildren . . . "
Prime Mini ster Mau rice Bishop

While much has been made of Grenada's alleged military
threat to its neighbors in the Eastern Caribbean, the only
"real" threat lay in the People's Revolutionary Government's (PRG) accomplishments since 1979. What the
island's invaders actually had come to fear was the "demonstration effect" the Grenadian Revolution created for
other Caribbeans who were dissatisfied with their lot and
who might have been persuaded by Grenada's example to
struggle to change things for the better.
When the Bishop government assumed power, Grenada,
like its neighbors, was suffering from the adverse effects of
the world recession. The demand for tropical exports-nutmeg, mace, bananas, and cocoa-was sluggish. In 1981 the
average world market price for nutmeg was $2.48 per pound,
but it fell first to $1.95 and then to $1.20 during 1982. The
price of cocoa, which had been $1.54 per pound in 1981,
had plunged to $0.81 a year later. Tourism lagged, and bankruptcies increased. These conditions produced little or no
growth throughout the region .
Nonetheless, Grenada was one of the very few countries
in the Western Hemisphere that had per capita growth in
the early 1980s. The New Jewel Movement (NJM) had implemented a comprehensive economic development strategy
which attacked the problems of a previously deteriorating
economy on several fronts. The government's program had
four goals and produced rather impressive results. These
goals were to: rehabilitate existing infrastructure and add
to Grenada's infrastructure investment, stimulate productive investment both on the part of the private sector and
through increased public investments, improve the efficiency
of the public sector and maintain sound public finances, and
emphasize agriculture and tourism. According to the World
Bank, Grenada was successfully " ... addressing the task
of rehabilitation and of laying better foundations for growth
within the framework of a mixed economy."
Agriculture clearly dominates Grenada's economy as the
main supplier of food, the major earner of foreign exchange,
and the largest employer. In implementing its goals, the PRG
spent fifty-four times more on agriculture than did the Gairy
government. The government enhanced and upgraded extension services and technical assistance to individual
farmers. It provided substantial flows of financial assistance
for banana and cocoa rehabilitation. It re-organized and rationalized state-owned farms and established private cooperatives of small farmers.
The World Bank estimated that the PRG's program resulted in nine percent per capita growth. The principal beneficiaries of this achievement were the Grenadian people. Unemployment fell from 49.0 percent in 1979 to 14.2 percent
in 1982. Considered a privilege under the Gairy regime,
education was made a right under the PRG. The latest census found only seven to ten percent illiteracy, down significantly from the fifteen percent projected by a 1979 World
Bank report. Free milk and hot lunches were provided for
primary school children. A new secondary school was constructed, and secondary school fees were reduced. University scholarships were increased from 3 in 1978 to 209 in
1981 .
Significant improvements also were made in health care
delivery. An increase in the number of doctors in residence
on the island allowed for major expansions in health care
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VIEWPOINT: A.W. SINGHAM
joined by two no n-OECS members, J amaica and Barbado,,
who had no business bei ng th ere exce pt fo r th e fact t hat
Prime Mini ster Ed wa rd Seaga a nd Pri me M in i, tcr Tom
Adam s, lik e Mrs. C harl es a nd Mr. Bird , , hare th e fo reig n
policy orientation s of th e Reaga n admin is tra ti o n. Thm, the
lik e- minded con servat ive co untries of th e Easte rn Caribbean, J amaica, and Barbados-who shared th e over-all economic, political, and social obj ecti ves of the Reagan admin istration - had joined together to und ert a ke thi s in vas io n .
Their aim was to create an America n milit ary bl oc in the
English-speaking Caribbean-thus co ntradi cting, at least for
some of them , th eir commitment to non-alignment.
This conservati ve bloc was experiencin g serious int ern al
economic problems which the y ha ve been unable to resolve .
The bulk of them are mon o-crop economies, who are hea vil y
dependent on the proposed Caribbean Basin Initiati ve (C BI) .
Hence, they saw thi s military alliance as a way out of th e
hell of underdevelopment and massive un employment th at
the people of their countri es fa ce. These are also countries
marked by internal political instability. They wanted the CBI
eventually to be transformed into a Caribbean security arrangement, creating a mini-NATO in the Caribbean. Therefore the internal characteri stics o f these countries-their inability to solve economic problems and to maintain law and
order within their countries-led them to search for a military security pact that would guarantee their regimes. Thi s
particular venture has transformed the English-speaking
Caribbean into a military zone-the very phenomena these
countries claimed they wanted to avoid.
Curiousl y, after the World Bank had given Grenada such
a clean bill of health, these countries began to be fearful
of Grenada 's mixed economy model. Up to this point, Puerto Rico had been considered the model; but it was becoming obvious that the Puerto Rican model was seriously
flawed. Not only did they fear Grenada ' s economic model,
but they feared that Grenada was embarking on a new model
of constitutional democracy that would seriously threaten
the existing elite structure of the Caribbean. We must remember that the two-party system-the Westminster
model-was essentially designed to guarantee democracy in
the Caribbean . However, this very Westminster model was
responsible for the rise of Eric Gairy in Grenada because
he was able to utilize it to consolidate a totalitarian regime.
He perverted the constitutional process and proceeded to
create a one-party system by exploiting the electoral system.
This was precisely what Bishop had opposed. He had argued
that this so-called Westminster model was totally unsuitable
for Grenada because to a large extent it tribalized a nontribal people . In other words, what we saw happening was
that the two-party system was utilized by the political elite
to divide the population into two separate groups and proceeded to use patronage to keep one faction in power and
to consolidate the political power of the party that had control over Parliament. Patronage then gave rise to a machine
or a gang. So what we had in Grenada under Gairy was not
two-party democracy but two-gang politics in which gangs
had replaced parties. Hence, Bishop's experiment with genuinely democratic institutions as an alternative to the existing two-party system which had been perverted by Caribbean governments was one of the greater threats that these
neighboring countries felt came from Grenada . D

The leaders of most of the countries of the Eastern Caribbean - in cluding Maurice Bi shop-signed a treaty which
form ed th e Organi zation of Eastern Caribbean States
(OECS) . That treaty was never registered at the United Nations; but we are told that this was a result of a bureaucratic
mi sunderstandin g and that they had planned to register it.
The prov isions o f the treaty allow a member country to requ est th at the other members aid them in the event of foreign
interventi on. o such request, as far as we know, came from
the governm ent of Grenada.
We are told, however, that the request was transmitted
by th e Governor General, who is a titular officer. Therefore ,
he has no ri ght what soever to speak for the government of
Grenada. Sir Paul Scoon was appointed by and owed his
job to Mauri ce Bishop who recommended Scoon's name to
Her Majesty the Queen of England. Her Majesty the Queen
then appointed him as a titular officer to take over the headship of the go vernment as her representative. Sir Paul proceeded to act extra-constitutionally according to both the
l 973 co nstitution and the people's law proclaimed by the
Bi sho p gove rnm ent. The British themselves are very wary
o f givin g power 10 the Queen's representative primarily
becau se in British Constitutional practice the Queen has no
auth o rit y o ver Parliament. The British fought very hard to
reta in Parliamentary supremacy over the rights of the
Crown . Sir Paul has not necessarily violated the constitution in term s of the letter of the law; but more importantly,
wh a t he has done is to destroy the conventions in British
Parli amentary practice which clearly would not allow for
hi s intervention. After all, Sir Paul was captured-some
would sa y liberated - by the U.S. marines. He was taken
to a ship off I he shore of Grenada then brought back to
hi s residence. Now he is being protected by the Barbadian
arm y. Therefore, Sir Paul owes his position to the occupying
po wer which enables him to govern . His Provisional Adviso ry Council essentially has been approved by and authenti cated by the United States and the other occupying countri es-thus making them spokespersons of the occupying
countries.
Moreover , the OECS treaty provides that all members be
present when such a decision is made. Now we are told that
some of the members were not present. We were informed
later , by a non-OECS member, that there was some confusion as to wheth er the request was coming from the countries to the United States or whether the United States was
alread y advi sing them about making the request. Hence, it
seems to me that the members of the OECS were determined
to play this role long before the so-called request came from
Sir Paul Scoon .
The major instigators of this particular move were P ri me
Minister Eugenia Charles from Dominica, Prime Minister
John Compton of St. Lucia, and Prime Minister Vere Bird
from Antigua, who had already indicated that they were
strong supporters of the Reagan administration. They were
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REAGAN WATCH: JUST WHAT HE ALWAYS WANTED
"Grenada, we were told, was a friendly island paradise for
tourism. But it wasn't. It was a Soviet-Cuban colony being
readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy. We got there just in time."
President Ronald Reagan

ment Association (IDA) when the U.S. used its influence
within the World Bank to prevent it from endorsing Grenada's public investment program.
Arguing that the proposed Grenadian international airport would accommodate Cuban military aircraft and would
be used as a forward base to disrupt the U.S. supply routes
in the Eastern Caribbean, the Reagan administration tried
to dissuade both attendance and pledges at a European Economic Community (EEC) co-financing conference on the
airport. The administration tried to convince EEC members
that the airport's 9000-foot runway would be longer than
necessary to service tourist and import/export traffic.
Despite arguments that Barbados (11,000 feet), Curacao
(13,000 feet) , Trinidad (10,000 feet), Bahamas (11,000 feet),
Guadeloupe (11,499 feet) , Martinique (10,827), and Puerto Rico (10,002) had airports with longer runways, the Reagan administration continued to rail against it. When the
EEC voted to honor Grenada's request, the U.S. began a
vicious propaganda campaign aimed at discrediting the
country. Transferring the attack from print to film, the
American Security Council Foundation released "Attack on
the Americas," in January 1981, depicting Grenada as a
Soviet stronghold. A five-part CBS television series released
in May, "The Prisoner and the Police State," alleged that
Grenada is a police state in which people are afraid to speak
and prisoners are tortured.
In June 1982 the U.S. offered $4 million to the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) on the condition that no
money go to Grenada. And like its predecessor, the Reagan
administration refused to extradite Gairy, failed to respond
to the appointment of a new Grenadian Ambassador-designate, instructed the new U.S. Ambassador to the Eastern
Caribbean to exclude Grenada from his charge, attacked the
regime in numerous public statements both here and abroad,
refused to acknowledge Grenadian attempts to normalize
relations, and excluded Grenada from participation in the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).
Meanwhile, the Reagan administration readied plans for
the destabilization of Grenada. The ghastly murder of
Maurice Bishop and his compatriots simply provided the
first available excuse to implement it. From August to October 1981, the U.S. military staged maneuvers which constituted a practice run for the ultimate invasion of Grenada.
On Vieques Island, the U.S. base off the coast of Puerto
Rico, more than 200,000 military personnel from the U.S.
and fourteen allied countries invaded "Red," "a mythical
island interfering in the region and shipping arms to Central America'' (Cuba), and '' Amber and the Amberdines,' '
"Our enemy in the Eastern Caribbean where U.S. hostages
were in need of rescue," (Grenada and the Grenadines). According to the fictional scenario, after rescuing the hostages,
the U.S. troops would remain on Amber to "install a regime
favorable to the way of life we espouse.'' Thus, the groundwork for the invasion had actually been laid as long as two
years ago. Although then Secretary of State Alexander Haig
discounted charges that these maneuvers had symbolic implications for Grenada, two years later, the very military
units that had participated in the Pentagon's hypothetical
war-scenario on Vieques were being parachuted into Grenada as part of "Operation Urgent Fury." In carrying out
the invasion of Grenada, President Reagan had fulfilled the
commitment made first during his 1980 campaign and maintained throughout his administration: to use U.S. military
power against any nation daring to·challenge North American control. □

Since assuming office, the Reagan administration has asserted that communism is on the march in the face of weak
and vacillating U.S. policies. His goal, therefore, has been
to employ the decisive action necessary to "relegate [communism] to the dust heap of history." In no region of the
world has he attempted to fulfill this "sacred trust" more
zealously than in the Caribbean. In this context, tiny Grenada took on special significance. If the U.S. could not stop
communism in "its own backyard," then where could it?
Finally, the Reagan administration had what it most wanted:
the perfect opportunity-in one fell swoop and at little cost
to the U.S.-to stamp out communism in Grenada, to teach
all other communists a lesson, and to restore American confidence in its ability to rule the world.
From the moment the Bishop government assumed power,
Grenada has been viewed as an irritant by U.S . policymakers. Open hostility toward Grenada began under the
Carter administration as early as April 1979. A series of
radio broadcasts from Gairy's new home in San Diego, California, calling for a counter-coup, prompted the Bishop
government to ask for security assistance from the United
States. Although the Carter administration refused Bishop's
request for bilateral assistance, it sent Frank Ortiz, the Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean, to meet with Prime Minister Bishop. Ortiz warned Bishop that the U.S. would "view
with displeasure any tendency on the part of Grenada to
develop closer ties with Cuba.'' The ambassador added that
talk of "mercenary invasions" would harm Grenada's tourist industry and offered $5000 from his discretionary fund
to aid in rebuilding the island.
When the Bishop government formalized relations with
Cuba, the outraged Carter administration considered Grenada to be a threat to U.S. interests and began to act accordingly. A number of measures, including covert operations against Grenada, were discussed. The National Security
Council (NSC) formulated a plan to initiate a blockade
against the country. After reviewing the options, the Carter
administration rejected the NSC plan, but it adopted other
measures designed to harass Grenada. The State Department
refused to accept the credentials of the Grenadian Ambassador-designate. Under pressure from the U.S., the Windward Islands Banana Growers Association excluded Grenada from a U.S. grant for the rehabilitation of hurricanedamaged banana trees. USAID attempted to block food
damage assistance for Grenada from the OAS Emergency
Fund. Charging that Grenada had not fulfilled legal requirements for extradition, the U.S. refused to return Gairy to
the island. Under the advice of State Department officials,
some travel agencies began to discourage their clients from
visiting Grenada. In addition a massive media campaign to
discredit Bishop and the PRG began in which newspapers
and magazines decried ''The Castroization of Grenada.''
The Reagan administration merely increased the intensity of attacks against Grenada begun by its predecessor. In
March 1981 the U.S. director on the Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) successfully opposed Grenada's application for a $6.3 million of IMF Special Drawing
Rights to be used for capital improvements. Grenada was
refused a $3 million loan from the International Develop7
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found in Grenada, it is clear that they are not sophisticated
weapons . Most of what I have seen were very light infantry
weapons . Even the anti-aircraft weapons we have been
shown are also very unsophisticated-fit for use by militias
or by personnel that are not highly-trained soldiers or troops.
But the U.S. officials only talk about "large numbers" or
"significant amounts;" they have not provided an accounting of the weapons in terms of what kinds were found. They
are trying to create the illusion that there was a large military
base on the island, but there is no way to prove that anything
of that kind was found in Grenada because it did not exist.
The only weapons in Grenada were those to be used by the
popular militia in case of an invasion. The tragic events that
led to the coup on October 19 so alienated the people of
Grenada from the group which took power that those weapons were not distributed to tbe people and a large part of
the population did not come out to support that group.
The Reagan administration acts or reacts out of a geopolitical conception of the world. They believe that events
in the world are due to the perceived weakness of the U.S.
after Vietnam and Watergate. They also believe that the
Soviet Union is constantly taking advantage of this perceived
weakness.
In fact things are quite different from what this administration believes. The world is moving towards consolidation
of the independence of nations of many sizes and the realization that any nation-regardless of size-has the right to
sovereignty. What has happened throughout the world is
not a question of the weakness of the U.S . It is not a question of any other power trying to take advantage of that
weakness. It is a result of historical, political, economic, and
social conditions objectively and concretely reflected in the
.
different countries.
If any lesson can be derived from what the U.S. has done
in Grenada, it is that Third World nations have to be bound
closer together in order to make it impossible for large
powers like the U.S. to act in blatant violation of international law with total disregard for the sovereignty and the
integrity of any nation, whether large or small. These events
show everyone in Latin America, for example, that they cannot look to the U.S. to favor their independent development.
It shows that Latin American countries have to stick together
and have to defend themselves if they want to maintain and
consolidate their sovereignty.
The U.S. has shown that it is only willing to support solutions of a military nature which creates greater obstacles for
efforts like those of the CONTADORA Group to find a
peaceful solution to the conflict in Central America. The
invasion shows that the U .S. does not support political and
peaceful solutions to problems, but only wants to impose
military solutions.
Cuba is convinced that a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Central America is possible, but we have little hope
that the U.S. will support this kind of a solution. We were
under the impression that the U.S. was not willing to go
ahead with a political solution for the problems in Central
America. Now, we have seen a very concrete example of
what the U.S . is capable of doing. Of course, the situations
are different, but the U.S. approach is quite similar. The
U.S. invasion of Grenada can lead only to more complicated
situations throughout the region and the hemisphere. D

The Cuban government and party had no previous knowledge of the differences within the New Jewel Movement
(NJM) which led to the coup and the events that followed.
In fact we were quite surprised when we learned from the
Grenadians for the first time on October 12 of the internal
struggle within the party. Although we had very close ties
with the NJM and in particular with Maurice Bishop, ht.
rightly chose not to discuss his difficulties within the party
with us. Even after October 12, we did not know exactly
what was going on, what the different positions were, and
how events were developing. We chose not to interfere in
any way in those events because it was an internal problem
to be solved bv the Grenadian people.
We had had quite extensive relations with Grenada since
1979. We tried to establish cooperation and to provide assistance to Grenada in different fields. The most important
project in which we were involved was the building of the
airport to which we were providing basically the labor force
for construction of the airstrip and the airport buildings.
Other equipment and services for the airport had been granted under contract to mainly British companies. We were also
involved in other assistance programs in public health, in
education, in the fishing industry, and in communications.
In addition we were requested to provide military assistance
and advice to Grenada because they had been certain of an
impending U.S. invasion since the first days of the revolution in 1979.
We had 784 Cubans in Grenada at the time of the invasion: 636 were construction workers; 43 were part of the
military advisory group (22 officers and the rest support
staff); 17 were public health workers; 19 were from the
Education, Fisheries, and Communications Ministries; and
18 were in our diplomatic mission. Among them were 44
women. The overwhelming majority of our workers were
construction workers. It would be very easy to access this
just by looking at them and by talking to them: the difference in ages, for example, and in physical fitness prove
that they were not the highly trained professional soldiers
that the Reagan administration alleged.
Grenada was a sovereign and independent country and,
as such, had all the rights to enter into agreements with any
other country for its defense. Grenada had been threatened
by invasion from the United States for a long time. The U.S.
was a threat to Grenada-not the reverse as was alleged by
the invaders. The U.S. is more than 27,000 times the size
of Grenada in territory and has 2,300 times the population
of Grenada. Grenada could not be a threat to the U.S. because it lacked the economic resources, the military resources, and the manpower resources to present a threat to
any other country in the region.
Looking at the tapes that were shown of the kind of
weapons that the U.S. military authorities have said were
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DEATH OF A PEACEFUL REVOLUTION
"No doctrine, no principle or proclaimed revolutionary position, and no internal division can justify atrocious events like
the physical elimination of Bishop and the group of outstanding, honest, and worthy leaders who died . . . "
Fidel Castro

at some point in ti ir tlevelopment irrl!spective of ideological
orientation.
Prime Minister Ma,,~d! Bishop is remi!fflbered as a leader
who had implicit faith q the "masses" antl who hoped to
restore the Grenadian pet>pl@'s confidence id their ability
to govern themselves . What'ev@r the issue, he argued that
the people-though their uniolis 1 mass organizations, and
assemblies-were to participate in tile search for a solution.
Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard led the other faction
within the Central Committee which expressed far more confidence in the government than in the people. This group
saw the party-not the organs of popular democracy-as
the most effective mechanism for resolving the revolution's
problems.
Ironically, Coard's supposedly "hard-line Marxist" position was far more typical of the Caribbean's widely-touted
tradition of democracy than anything else. Historically, only
a tiny portion of each island's population was ever able to
participate in or vote for their "representative" governments. Even after universal suffrage was extended by the
British in an attempt to appease anti-colonial sentiments
after WW II, most Caribbean leaders viewed themselves as
an elite representing those less capable of self-government.
It was this contemptuous and paternalistic view of the people
that the NJM had been trying to change through the structures of popular power and by expanding the party base.
Thus, even when faced with charges that he was violating
the party tenets of collective leadership and inefficiently
handling the business of the state apparatus, Prime Minister
Bishop urged that the allegations be brought to the people.
Similarly, when accused of initiating rumors that Bernard
and Phyllis Coard were trying to kill him, Bishop allegedly
refused to respond only to his fellow Central Committee
members but insisted that his case be heard by the general
population.
On the question of how best to allocate responsibility and
tasks however, Maurice Bishop was true to the Caribbean
tradition. Like other Prime Ministers throughout the region,
Bishop held several governmental positions of responsibility.
Bernard Coard argued that this was ineffective and hindered
both the making and implementation of decisions. It was
Coard's growing frustration with the supposed inefficiency
of the NJM decision-making process-coupled to be sure
with a large measure of personal ambition-which reputedly
led him to push for a formal system of collective leadership.
This notion of collective leadership, nonetheless, was no
more typical of the Caribbean tradition than was the attempt
to ensure mass participation in the political process. Throughout every era of their history, Grenadians had been loyal
to charismatic leaders-not sophisticated ideologies or political parties. Almost uniformly, these popular leaders represented elements of the relatively large black and "colored,"
middle-class elite which had had access to educational opportunities and professional training abroad. Bishop and Coard,
like most of the NJM leadership, came from this family
background; but Bishop had developed and maintained
stronger ties with the general populace. In recognition of
this, those advocating a new division of leadership responsibilities never suggested that Bishop be removed from office
publicly. Instead, they wanted Coard to assume control of
the party quietly while Bishop maintained the party's link
to mass organizations, unions, and popular assemblies. Ostensibly, it was Bishop's decision to revoke his prior agreement to the proposed change which marked the beginning
of what became the Grenadian Revolution's end. □

Many explanations have been offered for the collapse of
the PRG both from supporters and from opponents of the
Grenadian Revolution. Several surviving members of the
NJM have willingly acknowledged that the Central Committee made horrendous errors, but their views have not been
as widely disseminated as press speculations have been.
Therefore, those who have opposed the Grenadian Revolution historically have had a free hand in deliberately distorting the facts . Unfortunately however, much of the information needed to make an accurate assessment of what led
to the disaster in Grenada may never be made available.
The sequence of events which immediately preceded the
invasion has been well-publicized:
• September 14: The NJM Central Committee voted to
have Prime Minister Maurice Bishop share power with
Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard.
• October 13: the NJM Central Committee voted to place
Bishop under house arrest.
• October 14: the NJM announced that Bishop had been
removed from office for failing to share power and was
being replaced by Coard.
• October 15: Bishop's supporters protested his arrest and
demanded his release.
• October 17: Army Commander Hudson Austin announced that Coard had taken control of the government and reiterated that Bishop was under house arrest.
• October 18: Foreign Minister Unison Whiteman announced that he and three other ministers had resigned
in protest.
• October 19: Thousands of chanting demonstrators freed
Bishop from house arrest. Maurice Bishop, Jacqueline
Creft, Unison Whiteman, Vincent Noel, Fitzroy Bain,
and Noel Bain as well as an unknown number of demonstrators were killed. The army established a Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) to govern Grenada and
imposed a 24-hour, "shoot on sight" curfew.
• October 21: General Austin announced that he had been
named head of the 16-man RMC, dissolved the previous
government, dismissed its cabinet, and assumed full
power.
The Reagan administration was quick to explain the coup
by characterizing the division within the New Jewel Movement's Central Committee as one between moderate and
hard-line Marxists, insinuating that Maurice Bishop was
murdered deliberately because he sought to change the progressive direction of the PRG. Caribbean leaders collaborating with the U.S. invasion suggested that it was Bishop's
appointment of a constitutional commissio_n which led to
the development of a "communist" plot to remove him .
Further, these officials suggested that Cuba, a staunch supporter of Bishop and the PRG, had become disenchanted
with Grenada and sponsored the effort to remove Bishop
from his leadership position.
The facts would suggest, however , that the most fundamental points of contention within the NJM Central Committee involved classic questions not unique to any political
system . Who governs (the party or the people)? What style
of leadership is best (charismatic leadership or bureaucratic
rule)? What determines the rate of change (party leadership
or popular sentiment)? These same fundamental controversies have been predictable problems in all political systems
9
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tect themselves from internal opposition surely must not be
seen as sufficient justification to legitimate the U.S. invasion of another country .
It should be remembered that the Reagan admini stration
has threatened the invasion of Grenada since the Pentagon
conducted "Operation Ocean Venture" from August to October 1981-a military exercise directed at invading a fictitious island chain in the Caribbean called "Amber and the
Amberdines" (no relation-according to the administration-to Grenada and the Grenadines). This administration
continually frustrated and opposed the Bishop government.
President Reagan went on television early this year denouncing the construction of the new airport as an indication of
the military threat supposedly posed by Grenada. Yet, when
I visited Grenada in April 1982, I was told by all concerned
that the airport was necessary for commercial and touristic
purposes. Now, on my return trip following the invasion,
I am again told by everyone including Mr. Scoon, the Governor General, that the airport is of vital importance for the
future of the island . Any attempts to justify the invasion
based on Bishop's murder is the height of hypocrisy.
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the
U.S . mission was to rescue Americans on Grenada, that mission has already been accomplished and the troops should
be immediately withdrawn. We were told at first that the
troops would be staying only one week . Now it is expected
that they will have to remain well into 1984. Each additional
day alters their role . They are increasingly acting as an occupying, rather than as a peace-keeping force. They have
been involved in the tracking of alleged subversives. They
have participated in the interrogation and incarceration of
people whose only "crime" was to be an alleged supporter
of the Bishop government. They have stuck people in makeshift prison camps with shipping crates as beds . They have
even participated in searching for "subversive" books and
other reading materials which they have considered illegitimate. Clearly this is not the proper role of the American
military.
I would like to make one final point concerning an exchange between Prime Minister Tom Adams of Barbados
and myself. In front of the entire Congressional delegation,
Mr. Adams strongly stated that Congressional Black Caucus
opposition to the invasion showed a paternalistic attitude
toward Third World nations. I firmly responded to Mr.
Adams , stating very clearly to him that the Members of the
Caucus have never once taken the position that they knew
what was best for countries in the Caribbean or for any other
country. I stated to him that I am , as are my Caucus colleagues, an American elected to the U .S. House of Representatives; my obligation and my responsibility are to give my
analyses and make my best judgments. That Members of
the Congressional Black Caucus believed the invasion wrong
is not a paternalistic statement toward Third World countries rather it is a statement of what our country stands for
and ~four interest as American citizens. As an American
and as a Member of the House of Representatives , I neither
gave up the right to make independent judgments about
world events, nor should it be my role to acquiesce without
question to the self-interested policies of other world leaders
where U.S . actions are involved. It would be the height of
irresponsibility for me , or any other Member of Congressblack or white-to do otherwise. □

When Speaker of the House of Representatives Tip
O'Neill asked me to be part of the Congressional leadership delegation to investigate events surrounding the invasion of Grenada , I agreed to go with a commitment to investigate all aspects of the situation, not just those that might
reinforce my initial view. The trip not only confirmed my
initial assessment, but in fact raised man y new questionsquestions whose answers are to be found in Washington,
not in Grenada. Were the President's publicly-stated rationales the real reasons for this invasion? Were peaceful
alternatives ever considered or proposed; if so, why were
they rejected; and if not, why weren't they considered? Is
this use of military force an indication that, for this administration, the military option is the preferred solution,
rather than a last resort, in resolving international disputes?
What are the implications-political, diplomatic, militaryof the invasion? Why was the press forcibly denied permission to cover the invasion, and what are the implications
for a free press in a free society? Had the American people
been provided initially with all of the information which has
now come to light, would they have reached the same conclusions they reached as a result of the information manipulation carried out by the administration?
Congress should make a full investigation of the Grenada
situation, and I have introduced a Resolution of Inquiry to
begin this process. Although many questions remain to be
answered, I can say with virtual certainty that the safety of
the students was never the primary concern of either the
policymakers or the commanders of the U .S. forces in planning for or carrying out the invasion.
Our delegation could find not one confirmed instance in
which an American was threatened or endangered before
the invasion. If the safety of the students was the primary
goal, why did it take the U.S. forces over two days to reach
the Grand Anse campus which was a mere twenty meters
from an unprotected beach? The inescapable conclusion is
that the students' safety was a secondary goal of the
invasion .
In a two and a half hour meeting that the Congressional
delegation had with the Prime Ministers from the Eastern
Caribbean States, the question of the students ' safety was
never once raised. Instead, the Prime Ministers raised their
concern that a "leftist" Grenadian government "threatened" the Eastern Caribbean. The Prime Ministers emphasized their desire that the region might have more leaders
that reflected their own "moderate" views. What they apparently feared was not an external invasion launched from
Grenada, the supposed rationale behind invoking the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States charter, but rather
that improved conditions in Grenada would provide an example to their own citizens that might result in internal opposition to their policies. The desire of these officials to pro-
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invasion might have on Cuban policies. No mention was
made of Grenadian resistance or casualties, and commentators noted that it often seemed that the administration considered Cuba's expulsion from the island to be the real goal.
Not until the press ban had been lifted and Canadian journalists reported finding a mental hospital destroyed were
U.S . officials even willing to estimate the number of Grenadians killed and injured. Spokespersons for the administration were instead anxious to shift world attention to the
sheds containing handguns and ammunition found by U.S.
forces. Most of the equipment was antiquated, and even the
most modern of the weapons constituted no threat to the
U.S. After examining the "huge arms cache," Mike Royko
wrote in the Chicago Sun-Times on November I:

" I rhink rhe A merican people werP hungry_{or a mtfitary success, ro have somerhing go righr afrer we gor in volved. "
Senator Sam Nunn

Less than two weeks after the New Jewel Movement Central Committee voted to place Maurice Bishop under house
arrest and only two days after the bombing of U.S. Marine
Headquarters in Lebanon, the U.S . Armed Forces invaded
Grenada . Shortly thereafter, President Reagan appeared
with Dominican Prime Minister Eugenia Charles by his side
and began offering duplicitous rationales for the U.S.sponsored invasion . In order to best manipulate public opinion, the administration excluded members of the press from
the island until "hostilities" had ceased, citing as concerns
the reporters' safety and the need to preserve national security. Although hailed by Reagan supporters as a victory, the
invasion of Grenada has raised new doubts and rekindled
old fears throughout the world about the nature of U.S.
foreign policy.
President Reagan first argued that the invasion was necessary to protect the lives of U.S . medical students studying on the island. Only after it was known that officials of
the medical school and parents of the students had opposed
the invasion and had been convinced that the students were
in little jeopardy were the administration's claims investigated .
Next, Prime Minister Eugenia Charles was thrust forward
as the representative of Grenada's "threatened neighbor
states," who requested the U.S. invasion . Quoting the obscure and unofficial OECS treaty, President Reagan and
Prime Minister Charles attempted to convince the world that
the invasion was not only legal, but the fulfillment of an
obligation under law. These arguments quickly were dismissed once the actual treaty was obtained and its language
examined.
Again, as more information became available, it became
clear that the OECS treaty was only a pretext for the Reagan
administration's own decision to invade. Indeed, the "invitation'' from the OECS countries to the U.S. was drafted
in Washington and transmitted to the meeting in which the
proposed invasion was discussed by Milan Bish, U.S . Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean. Both the U.S. Ambassador and Prime Minister Seaga of Jamaica were present
at this "OECS" meeting held in Barbados, a non-OECS
country. Although not parties to the treaty, both Seaga and
Bish participated in the discussion, urging that an invitation to invade be issued in the name of the OECS. _Staunchly proclaiming that the islands of the region were inseparable
and that the action taken against Grenada was done out of
familial concern, Caribbean leaders supporting the invasion
made no mention of th e proposed action to the regional
heads of state in attendance at the CARI COM meeting held
in Trinidad to consider the cri sis. Instead, the supporters
of the invasion curried fav o r with the Reagan administration while deliberately deceiving fellow CARI COM members
(the Bahamas, Belize, Guyana, and Trinidad) which strongly
opposed military intervention.
When the administration's first two justifications were debunked within two days, Reagan offered another rationale
for the in vasion which proved equally ludicrous. Supposedly, the island of Grenada had become a Soviet-Cuban military base. T herefore, he argued U.S. forces had arrived " just
in time " to prevent such a takeover. To buttress this argument , administration officials focused only on the resistance
of Cuban construction workers and the potential impact the

The weapons in one of the "arehouses turned o ut 10 be ,ach
of rice and cans of sardines. Another had truck pans . A third
was filled with canteen s and cl o 1hing . A, for the 1hree warehouses 1ha1 did ha ve wea po n, -1hey weren't sta cked 10 th e
ceilin g, a s 1he president ,aid . Th e~ were about one-founh
full. Man y o f1he rifle, were made in 1870- old breach-loading saddle guns. Other, were W\\' 11 , image . . . ii wa , an
arsenal, all righ1. bu1 you ' ll find more ba ng for your buck
in any Ameri can gun sh o p .

Although each of the three ju~tifications offered by the
Reagan administration came to be eventually discredited,
the reasons they publicly stated for the invasion seemed
almost immaterial. The important fact was that three years
of hard-line rhetoric against the Grenadian Revolution had
been transformed into action-not that it had taken seven
thousand specially-trained U .S. forces , ele\'en warships (including aircraft and helicopter carriers), and dozens of transport planes to conquer a virtually unarmed people. Returning combat troops were treated as heroes, but the equipment
malfunctions and self-inflicted accidental casualties were
rarely mentioned. Off the record, military advisors commented that against an y force other than one as marginally
equipped as Grenada's, the militar y objectives of the invasion would not have been met. Publi cly however, the invasion was portrayed as an experiment for the military designed to test the logi stics of conducting certain kinds of
intervention.
The tragic aspects of th e Grenada inva~ion go far beyond
the loss of at least 160 Grenadian, 7 I Cuban, and 18 American lives. Several dangerous precedents were established , and
accepted principles violated. The relatively sacred first
amendment right of a free press-one that the United States
is quick to impose on countries even with no similar provision in their constitution-was ignored and then disparaged
by admini stration official s who proudly revealed that military officials had been allowed to decide that reporters
should be excluded from the scene . The callous indifference
exhibited toward Grenadians themselves once again reinforced the notion that black lives are expendable: exact
figures were available on the number of bullets used before
there was any accounting of Grenadian casualties. The government of Grenada, like those of progressive African states,
was portrayed as incapable of action without Cuban or
Soviet directions . President Reagan denigrated the use of
international fora or regional institutions to preserve peace
by scorning the significance of worldwide condemnation
which followed the invasion. Instead of considering force
to be a last resort, the U.S. government had proven again
that it will first move unilaterally against those daring to
attempt another process of societal development and that
only countries capable of presenting a military threat will
be entitled to peaceful co-existence. · =:J
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General occupies a purely ceremonial position. He is the
representative of the Queen in her capacity as nominal and
entirely ceremonial head of the host state. It is a measure
of his authority that the Governor General is nominatedin effect named-by the Prime Minister of the state where
he serves.
Rhodesia was a semi-independent country in 1965 at the
time of its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).
Great Britain still retained ultimate authority over the country's foreign and defense policy. Nevertheless, when prior
to UDI, Rhodesia withdrew from the Central African Federation, a step which many regarded as preliminary to a unilateral declaration of independence, the British government
took the position that it had no right to reassert authority
over this semi-independent colony. When it was argued that
sovereignty and hence final authority in all matters rested
with Parliament, the British government answered that an
act of Parliament narrowing Rhodesia's internal self-government would violate British constitutional traditions.
To suggest that the Governor General had the authority
to invite in a foreign force is to betray either hypocrisy or
ignorance. And the U.S. cannot avoid this point by '?anipulating its recognition of the government of Grenada m order
to attribute authority to someone who clearly did not have
either formal authority or effective control.
We are now reduced to the final rationale. One would
have to argue that Grenada had been occupied by a foreign
power and its lawful government eliminated. Therefore, although there was no one to invite the U.S. in to rescue the
country, the U.S. could engage in an act of "collective selfdefense," on the assumption that, under the stipulated conditions, a request for assistance should be implied. ~ertainly,
one could imagine a case in which some sudden, rapid movement of foreign forces into a country resulted in the extermination of the government. In such a case, the government
would revert to the people of the country. Clearly, there
would have been an act of aggression and an occupation
of the country; and under the UN Charter, intervention
would have been permissible.
In the case of Grenada, the argument would have to be
made that Cuba had occupied the island. Are there facts
to support that argument? It seems to me that the answer
is no. There were some allegations made. Indeed, the Reagan
administration tried in the first several days to present or
at least imply such an argument. But we now have enough
facts to see that the implication is baseless. Most Cubans
were in fact engaged in construction and other aid activities.
All were there at the invitation of the indisputably legitimate
Bishop government. And there is no evidence that they connived with the persons who seized power from Bishop. On
the contrary, now having the minutes of the Grenadian Central Committee meetings, we can see that the Cuban condemnation of Bishop's overthrow was an honest expression
of its views. There is no shred of evidence that the coup
against Bishop was planned by the Cubans or even su?sequently and tacitly approved by them. The country remamed
in the hands of Grenadians. The hands were bloody. Unfortunately, the fratricidal coup is not a singular phenomenon in today's world. If every coup were held to justify
armed intervention, little would be left of the doctrine of
non-intervention. □

Under the view of international law held by the vast majority of Western scholars, there are only three legal justifications for sending troops into a foreign state. One is the rescue
of one's own citizens. Most Third World scholars and governments categorically reject this rationale in part because
invasions were carried out during the nineteenth and well
into the twentieth centur y not so much to rescue citizens as
to protect property. Hence the doctrine of so-called
"H umanitarian Intervention " carries disagreeable historical
baggage. Nonetheless, most Western scholars:,~ould argue
that at least where a substantial number of c1t1zens are at
risk, the prohibition against projecting power across national
frontiers does not control.
There are, however, certain conditions which have to be
satisfied before a country can legally carry out an invasion
to rescue its citizens. One condition is prior exhaustion of
remedies. If the danger to human life is not so imminent
that immediate action is required, then non-military remedies must be tried. If time permits, a country must, for example, negotiate with the target state in an effort to obtain
necessary guarantees.
It seems awfully clear now to the outsider-as it apparently was clear to the Reagan administration at the time-that
there was no imminent threat to American citizens in Grenada. Since the coup leaders seemed to be in control and
had gone out of their way to reassure U.S. citizens ~hat they
would not be harmed , the existence of any threat 1s debatable. In any event, as long as no imminent threat existed
the exhaustion-of-remedies requirement could not be
satisfied.
The U.S. alleged that the airport was closed on the Monday before the invasion. We now know that the airport was
useable at least for chartered flights, since some persons
in fact ~ere evacuated. The only authentic fear concerning
the safety of the U.S . citizens seems to have stemmed from
the belief that in the event of a decision to invade Grenada-in the event, that is, of a decision to violate international law-the Grenadian securit y forces would be terribly
tempted to use U.S. citizens as hostages. Obviously, the U.S .
cannot bootstrap a legal justification for the invasion by invoking the possibility of an illegal act (taking hostages) occurring as a consequence of its own, prior illegal act. That's
hardly a serious argument. So we can simply reject the protection-of-nationals rationale.
Only two possible legal justifications remain. One is the
argument that the U.S. was responding to an invitation from
the Island's duly constituted authorities. This argument has
not been pressed very hard because it is so palpably ludicrous. The so-called authority, who may or may not have
issued such an invitation, was Sir Paul Scoon, the Governor General. But in Commonwealth states that have
achieved full independence, as Grenada had, the Governor

Tom Farer was President of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights from 1980-1982 and is a fellow at the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars.
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THE I'.\1V ASION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Contrary to the assertions made by the Reagan administration, the invasion of Grenada found no sa nction in international law. None of the documents cited by proponents
of the in\·asion actually read in support of the action taken
by the in\·ading countries. In fact the language of relevant
provisions directly contradicts any argument offered in support of the invasion. The action was neither authorized by
the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) or
Rio treaties , nor was it in conformity with the Charters of
the Organization of American States or the United Nations.
Article 8 of the Treary Esrablishing rhe Organizarion of
Eastern Caribbean Srates has been most frequently invoked
to justify the request for a U.S.-led invasion of Grenada.
However, the provisional language of Article 8 clearly requires unanimity and authorizes collective action only
against external aggression:

also chosen to selectively cite Article 22 of the OAS charter
to buttress their claim of the invasion's adherence to norms
established through international law:
Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and secur ity in accordance with existing treaties do not const itut e a
violation of the principles set forth in Articles 18 and 20.

However, legal analysts concur in an understanding that the
Article 22 reference to "existing treaties" pertains only to
agreements that existed at the time of the OAS Charter
(1947) or its latest Amendments (1967) . The 1981 signatory
date of the Treaty establishing the OECS thus excludes it
from consideration within the parameters of this provision.
Defenders of the United States ''splendid little war'' also
chose to cite Article 52 of Chapter VII from the UN Charter
to bolster their claim of legality. However, while Subsection I of Article 52 states that regional arrangements are
not precluded by the Charter, Subsection 2 of the same article is equally clear in asserting that regional agencies should
make every effort to achieve pacific settlements of local
disputes:

The Defense and Security Committee shall have responsibility
for co-ordinating the efforts of :vlember States for collective defense and the presen·a1ion of peace and security against
external aggression and for the development of close ties
among the :vlember States of th e Organization in maners of
external defense and securit y, including measures to co mbat the activities of mercena ri es, operating with or without
the support of internal or national elements, in the exercise
of the inherent right of indi vidual or collective self-defen se
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the U11i1ed 'at ions ... The decision and directives of the Defense and
Security Committee shall be unanimous and shall be binding
on all subordinate institutions of the Organization unless
otherwise determined by the Authority.

No thing in the present Charter precludes the exi,1ence of
regional arra ngement s or agencies for dealing with , uch matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and
security as are appropriate for regional action, pro,·idcd 1ha1
such arrangements or agencies and their ac 1i vi1ie, arc consisten t with the purposes and principles of the United Nations . . . . The members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or const ituting suc h agencies shall make
every effort to achieve pacific sett lem ent of loca l di spute;
through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Securit y Cou ncil.

While other members of the OECS voted to invade, Grenada
was not represented at the meeting in which the issue was
being considered. Since none of the parties has seriously tried
to argue that Grenada constituted an external threat, clearly neither of the two conditions of Article 8 was satisfied.
Advocates of the invasion who cited these OECS provisions
during the UN debate on the issue were quickly reminded
not only of the failure to meet Article 8 criteria, but of the
fact that the treaty never had been duly registered with the
UN Secretariat (pursuant to Article 102 of the United Nations Charter) so could not be invoked before that body as
a basis for action.
Not surprisingly, proponents of the invasion omit any reference to Articles 18 or 20 of the OAS Charter because the
actions taken by the United States and its six Caribbean allies
are in direct violation of each. Articles I 8 and 22 state:

Further, Article 53 states that regional agencies are not to
take enforcement action without the authorization of the
U.N. Security Council-except in cases against the Axis
powers of WWII:
The Security Council sha ll , where appropriate, utilize such
regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement act ion
under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be tak en
under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without
the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as de fined in
paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant 10 Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal
of aggressive policy on the part of any such stat e, until such
time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments
concerned , be charged with the respo nsibilit y for preventing
further aggression by such a state .... The term enemy state
as used in paragraph I of this Article applies to any state
which during the Second World War has been an enemy of
any signator y of the present Charter.

No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly
or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the interna l or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the
State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements
.. The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the
object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other
measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or
special advantages obtained either by force or by other means
of coercion shall be recognized.

The misrepresentation of documentary provisions is only one aspect of the administration's effort to disguise the
illegality of its action in Grenada. An illusion of legality can
only be maintained through public unawareness of the fundamental concepts adapted by international consensus
through Chapter I of the UN Charter:

Instead, those arguing on behalf of the U.S. invasion cite
the Rio Treaty, which established a permanent defensive alliance among the republics of the Americas in 1947, one year
before the Charter of the Organization of American States
was signed. None of the English-speaking Caribbean states
was independent at that time, however, and so were not parties to the Rio Treaty which has in any case been superceded by the subsequent OAS Charter.
Proponents of the administration's Grenada action have

... The [UNI is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members ... All members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state

Using any standard of international law, the territorial integrity and political independence of the Grenadian state
have been violated by the U .S.-sponsored invasion and
occupation. D
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overrun the country. What the party stood for and the way
in which it carried out that process will eventually grow and
go forward.
The Revolutionary Military Council-of which so much
has been heard-must be condemned as a force that broke
the tradition of the party. One of the most basic and fundamental traditions of the party was its unrelenting and continuous link with the people. The People's Revolutionary
Government, led by a very able and committed cadre, was
a reflection precisely of these social, political, and other
realities in the country. They had a commitment to a small,
poor country that was struggling to get out of the claws of
dependent underdevelopment and were willing to put their
shoulders to the wheel.
The Central Committee which existed for one week before
the execution of Maurice Bishop and the Revolutionary
Military Council which was formed immediately after the
executions had divorced themselves from that reality. They
had lost touch with what was happening in the country. They
became alienated from the most important and critical pillar
of our revolution: we must be grounded in the people, we
must abide by the wishes of the people, and we must march
with them not run ahead of them.
While we do not know the full reasons or the full forces
both internal and external that have contributed to this
serious setback in the process of our revolution, we must
understand that blame must be fully and squarely laid at
the feet of those who comprised the decision-making structure during those critical hours because they broke ranks
with the people. How could a revolution which brought so
many issues for decision before the people-legislation about
women, decisions on the budget, decisions on other major
issues-consider removing the leader of the revolution without bringing it to the people? That in itself represented a
total abrogation of the most basic and vital element of our
political philosophy and culture. Those who made the fatal
errors merely created an artificial political structure (one
could hardly describe it as a leadership) which failed completely to understand the continuum along which the Grenadian revolution had developed.
What is happening in Grenada now in terms of the program of fierce and brutal occupation is both absolutely unjustified and totally dishonorable. The American people
ought not allow such a program to be carried out in their
name. They also have an obligation to seek to avert yet
another invasion, yet another military expedition into
Nicaragua or El Salvador or some other country for that
matter. There are 7,000 American troops in Honduras on
the Nicaraguan border now. Over the last several years, we
have seen the continued expansion of U.S. military personnel in Lebanon, the Philippines, and in other places. I ask
the American people to stand guard so that there are no
more Grenadas in this or any other part of the world. I also
ask that they assist Grenada in the search for its sovereignty. No good can come for either the Grenadian or the American people by having Grenada transformed into another
Puerto Rico in the Americas.
The Grenadian Revolution which so many of us embraced, supported, criticized, learned from, and lived with
is going through a very difficult period. We go forward,
however, saying and believing that it is truly forward ever
D
and backward never.

There have been many reports that the invasion of our
country was welcomed by the Grenadian population both
at home and abroad. This is a very sad and unfortunate position for our people. Against the background of confusion,
fear, and grief over the losses of loved ones and respected
leaders and given the psychological program which has been
employed since the moment the soldiers landed, I understand why some have reacted in this way. We must be honest
and acknowledge that on the 25th of October a very tense
and politically very difficult situation existed in Grenada.
But the views of the Grenadian people which have been
reported also must be seen as part of the psychological program being orchestrated by the invaders.
I do not expect, however, our people to continue to hold
this position for very long. It will be one of the more complex political issues for a long time to come, but it will never
be considered politically correct to have welcomed an external military occupying force as a freedom train. This
would be a break with our history and with our principles.
As <;mr people are allowed to be free psychologically to
analyze the events, to search for internal solutions, and to
express themselves-as they cannot do under U.S. occupation-we will see further clarity on this point.
Now, the program of occupation is very intense. The
United States government is lord over decisions which should
be made by the sovereign state of Grenada. The U.S. forces
have decided whom to expel and whom they will allow to
remain. They have arrested, interrogated, searched, warned,
and harassed more than two thousand Grenadian citizens,
including George Louison and Kendrick Radix, two surviving leaders of the People's Revolutionary Government. They
have established military camps around the country to house
those who have been detained in little boxes. Ironically, the
Reagan administration recently established in tiny Grenada
one of the largest embassies that it has in the Caribbean.
Grenada, with which the U.S. government refused to establish diplomatic relations, now has a U.S. Embassy that
employs nearly eighty people.
I am clear and confident that the occupation of Grenada
cannot last and will not last. My optimism is based on a
number of factors . We must remember that the New Jewel
Movement was a party which was grounded in the people.
It was a party of ordinary workers, students, housewives,
women, and others who understood the historic role that
we were playing in our country. We were working to move
Grenada out of those dark, dismal days of brutality and
poverty and into a new phase of popular participation, progress, and betterment for all of our people.
The party, which grew over these last ten years, had this
character, this origin, and this relation with our society. That
does not go away because six thousand U.S. soldiers have

Dessima Williams was Grenada's Ambassador to the
Organization of American States.
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COLONY IN THE MAKING
" ... [T]he island's independence is not very much in evidence .
. Grenada looks like nothing so much as a new U.S. dependency . There is hardly a11 aspect of Grenadian life that
is not tinged by the o verwhelming U.S. presence ... "
Loren Jenkin s, The Washin gton Post

Since the first days of the invasion, the United States has
been establishing the mechanisms for its domination of Grenada for the foreseeable future. U.S. military forces-not
Grenadian police or Caribbean troops-arrested and detained
individuals, conducted warrantless searches of people and
property, interrogated citizens and foreigners about their political beliefs and associations, warned people not to participate in "anti-government" activities, and seized so-called
"pro-Marxist" literature. American troops built the detention facilities that consisted of small, wooden cells used to
contain 1200 people suspected of being active in the former
People's Revolutionary Government. Meanwhile, the U.S .
Army Psychological Operations Battalion prepared and circulated posters of Hudson Austin and Bernard Coard in
humiliating positions and demeaning states of undress,
broadcasted public service announcements for the U.S. Navy
technicians operating the lone radio station, and otherwise attempted to general popular sentiment against the revolution.
Reports of constitutional violations and civil liberty abuses
only served to highlight the very nebulous nature of any legal
authority on the island. Although the U.S. thrust Sir Paul
Scoon into the limelight, the preeminent authorities on the
island indisputably were first Major General Jack Farris,
commander of the U.S. forces in Grenada, and now Charles
Gillespie, the new U.S. ambassador to Grenada. The interim
Attorney General already has resigned stating, "I have never
known a situation where a Governor General appoints
himself as savior for his people, calls in foreign armies, and
then does very little to bring about a restoration of constitutional civil government."
The relationship between the formal authority of interim
government officials and the substantive power of U.S. authorities can be illustrated by their divergent approaches to
the resolution of questions surrounding the circumstances
of Bishop's death. One of the interim government's earliest
pronouncements concerned the formation of a commission
to conduct an official inquiry into the deaths at Fort Rupert.
Yet the interim government's legal advisor announced that
such an investigatory commission would inherently compromise the right of any accused to a fair trial. Instead, U.S.
civilian authorities-reported to include CIA interrogatorsare to acquire and present evidence of official conduct during the power struggle which led to the murder of Bishop.
Perhaps because U.S. forensic experts had claimed earlier
that no positive identification of Bishop's body was possible, even Grenadians who did not support PRG policies
suspected that U.S. officials would deliberately withhold the
truth in order to prevent popular affection for Bishop from
becoming a renewal of support for "the revo." With only
Grenada's traffic officers functioning in their normal capacity however, Grenadians have no source of redress. Even
police functions have been assumed by U.S. soldiers and
CIA interrogators or by the Caribbean peace-keeping force
led by Major General Farris.
In addition the Reagan administration has been seeking
to win support from Grenada's private sector by flooding
the island's economy with dollars. According to Newsweek,

"Now that the U.S . invasion of Grenada has made the island
safe for capitalism , the Commerce Department has been
deluged with inquiries from businessmen looking for cheap
labor or beach front property.'' Fifty representatives of trade
associations, corporations, and non-profit associations were
invited to the White House for a pep talk on the potential
value of an investment in Grenada. Reagan administration
officials have been urging U.S. businessmen to take their
credit and technology to Grenada where raw materials and
labor are relatively cheap. USA! D has facilitated the exploration of profitable investment opportunities in Grenada
by arranging for potential businessmen to travel together
and to meet their "small but vital" Grenadian counterparts.
Although careful to explain that the current level of government aid to Grenada will have to be tapered down in the
future, Reagan administration officials also have stressed
that Grenada's tax policies and investment codes will be
changed to fit the provisions of the CBI. USAID spokespersons have announced: a $5 million ass istance grant has
been awarded the new Grenadian government, $4.5 million
has been allocated for the rehabilitation of 12 to 14 miles
of the worst roads and the short-term training of publi c
works personnel, $2.5 million has been granted for social
service programs, $2 million for agriculture , and$ I million
for such private sector initiatives as a local Chamber of
Commerce study of "laws and regulations ." Anoth er $15
million is to fund a military training program for Grenada
and the 6 nations which contributed to the 300-man Caribbean contingent of the U .S.-led invasion . Almost $3.5 million more will be sent to Grenada for emergency aid .
The $34.4 million financial assistance program designated
for Grenada in the current fiscal year and the $18.4 million
given Grenada by the United States since the invasion have
been used by the Reagan supporters to imply that the $22.5
million granted Grenada by the "Communist Bloc" in 1982
was stingy and inconsequential. Nonetheless, even U.S . State
Department officials have had to acknowledge that currently
the island's most pressing need is for doctors to replace the
Cuban physicians who were expelled. Reagan administration
officials also have had to concede that Grenada is in dire
need of a modern airport and that it would make little sense
to leave the Point Salines site only two-thirds complete .
Some U.S . spokespersons have suggested that any modern
airport be named after Paul Scoon, their "man of the
hour," but they have quietly voiced their fear that Grenadians will consider only one name-Maurice Bishop .
Shortly after the invasion, Grenada's interim government
promised that true self-governance would be achieved when
elections were held within six months. More recent pronouncements indicate that this is highly improbable: current
predictions are that elections may be as much as three years
away. Moreover, the Reagan administration will relinquish
ultimate control over Grenadian affairs only when the last
vestiges of the PRG have been swept away and the election
of a government more to its liking is assured. Until such
time, U .S. combat troops may have been sent home, but
real power will remain in American hands. Consequently,
some Grenadians have begun to ask when the once-welcomed Americans will leave. As one young Grenadian inquired, " ... who is going to rescue us from our rescuers."
Despite the U.S. largess, open hostility toward a protracted
occupation of the island will grow. Unless the Reagan administration allows genuine self-determination for that nation soon, Grenadian support for the invaders will surely
fade . D
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